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Abstract—For better data availability and accessibility while
ensuring data secrecy, organizations often tend to outsource their
encrypted data to the cloud storage servers, thus bringing the
challenge of keyword search over encrypted data. In this paper,
we propose a novel authorized keyword search scheme using
Role-Based Encryption (RBE) technique in a cloud environment.
The contributions of this paper are multi-fold. First, it presents a
keyword search scheme which enables only the authorized users,
having proper assigned roles, to delegate keyword-based data
search capabilities over encrypted data to the cloud providers
without disclosing any sensitive information. Second, it supports
a multi-organization cloud environment, where the users can
be associated with more than one organization. Third, the pro-
posed scheme provides efficient decryption, conjunctive keyword
search and revocation mechanisms. Fourth, the proposed scheme
outsources expensive cryptographic operations in decryption
to the cloud in a secure manner. Fifth, we have provided a
formal security analysis to prove that the proposed scheme
is semantically secure against Chosen Plaintext and Chosen
Keyword Attacks. Finally, our performance analysis shows that
the proposed scheme is suitable for practical applications.
Index Terms—Role-based encryption, role-based access con-
trol, searchable encryption, keyword search, outsourced decryp-
tion, provable security, cloud data privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the ever-increasing amount of digital information,
individuals and organizations are now storing/outsourcing their
data in the cloud to make use of features such as better
accessibility, high availability, reduction of maintenance and
initial investment costs [1]. However, with sensitive data stored
in the cloud (e.g. see McAfee report [2]) and legal concerns
(such as compliance to the European General Data Protection
Regulation - GDPR1), security and privacy have become
major issues in cloud data storage2. To preserve privacy and
confidentiality of outsourced data in the cloud, a preferred
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technique that is often used is encryption-before-outsourcing.
The encryption-before-outsourcing technique enables the data
owners (i.e. entities owning the data) to outsource their sensi-
tive data in the cloud in an encrypted form. As such, no entity
including the cloud service provider can access the sensitive
plaintext data without having access to proper decryption key.
This, however, restricts data retrieval/search over encrypted
data [4]. A trivial solution is to download the whole encrypted
database, and then perform the search operation locally after
decryption. It is clear that this is not practical. An alternative
approach is to allow the service provider to decrypt all the
encrypted data so that it can perform search operation over
the plaintext data. However, this violates data privacy.
Searchable Encryption (SE) has gained a considerable
amount of interest from the research community to address
the issue of searching over encrypted data [5]. In SE, users
delegate data search capabilities for some keywords over the
encrypted data to a service provider without disclosing any
useful information about the searched keywords and the actual
content of the encrypted data. This process is also referred
to as keyword search. Typically, in keyword search, data
owners outsource their data in an encrypted form along with
an encrypted index of keywords. Whenever a user wants to
access data, the user sends the desired keywords in the form of
trapdoors to the service provider. In return, the service provider
uses the trapdoors to perform search over the encrypted
indexes and sends the associated encrypted data, if there is
a match between the keywords associated with the trapdoor
and encrypted indexes.
Many works have been done in the area of keyword search,
achieving search authorization in a coarse-grained way. That
is, the users can search all the keywords using their secret
keys [6]. However, this kind of authorization may disclose
sensitive information. For example, Organization A outsources
its data files to the cloud so that its employees can easily access
them. Assume Organization A is a participant in a consortium
with another Organization B and other organizations. Suppose,
some files are associated with the keywords “Organization B”
and “Project X” which are only allowed to be accessed by the
Managers in the Organization A. In this case, if an adversary
can search for the keywords “Organization B” and “Project
X” and gets all the encrypted files associated with these two
keywords. This will eventually reveal, without knowing the
actual content, that Organization A and Organization B are
collaborating on Project X, which may not be desirable.
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2To address this problem, several authorized keyword search
schemes have been proposed for multi-user settings using dif-
ferent cryptographic techniques, e.g. Pairing-Based Encryption
[7], Predicate Encryption [8] and Attribute-Based Encryption
[6], [9], where multiple users are able to perform keyword
search operations based on some access policies. However,
none of these techniques efficiently support hierarchies in an
organization, where higher level authorities can inherit access
rights of their subordinates. As such, all these schemes [6]–
[9] are not able to reflect efficiently organization’s policies and
structures3 [11].
Role-Based Encryption (RBE) [10], [12], [13] is an emerg-
ing cryptographic technique, which combines both properties
of the traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [14]
and cryptographic encryption methods, to achieve data access
control over encrypted data. In RBE, the data owner encrypts
data using a RBAC access policy defined over some roles4,
and any user having proper roles can derive the secret keys for
decryption. Unlike the traditional RBAC method, RBE enables
the data owners to define and enforce RBAC access policies on
the encrypted data itself. This, in turn, reduces the dependency
of the data owners on untrusted service provider for defining
and enforcing access policies while sharing data with other
authorized users. Moreover, similar to the RBAC, in RBE,
roles can inherit access permissions from other roles [10].
Hence, the roles can be organized in a hierarchical structure.
This is one of the main advantages of RBE over other
encryption mechanisms such as Attribute-Based Encryption
[15], [16], as it can reflect closely a real-world organisation’s
policies and structure. The inheritance property of the RBE
makes it more suitable for large scale organizations such
as enterprises with a complex hierarchical structures [10].
Therefore, RBE is a more suitable cryptographic technique for
designing a keyword search mechanism compared with other
cryptographic techniques such as the ABE.
RBE has been used to provide data access control in cloud
environments over encrypted data [10], [11], [13]. However,
they mainly focus on a single organization cloud environ-
ment scenario, where users can have roles only in a single
organization and hence can access data associated with only
that organization. In many practical scenarios in a cloud
environment, a data owner may want to share his/her data
with users in several organizations having different roles. For
example, a user may work as a researcher and doctor in a
clinical research laboratory and hospital respectively. As such,
the same user will hold roles in the clinical research laboratory
and the hospital. The data owner can specify a RBAC access
policy in such a way that only the users having the access
privileges for the roles “Researcher” and “Doctor” can gain
access to the actual content corresponding to the encrypted
data.
This paper further investigates the aforementioned research
gaps and proposes a novel keyword search scheme using
the RBE technique where organizations outsource their data
3In an organization, typically employees are organized in a hierarchical
way based on their responsibilities and qualification [10].
4In an organization, roles are typically created based on job functions.
to a public cloud. The proposed scheme supports a multi-
organization environment, where users can possess roles from
more than one organization. It also enables the data owners to
define and enforce RBAC access policies on encrypted data,
thereby allowing any a user having authorized roles to perform
a keyword search along with the ability to decrypt. The salient
features of the proposed scheme are as follows:
1) An authorized keyword search mechanism is proposed
using RBE technique so that only the users possessing
authorized roles can delegate keyword search capabili-
ties over encrypted data to the public cloud.
2) The proposed scheme supports multi-organization cloud
environment, where a user can be associated with more
than one organization, having one or more roles in
different organizations.
3) Conjunctive keyword search5 functionality is supported
without any significant overhead in the system.
4) A user revocation mechanism has been introduced to
revoke unintended users.
5) An outsourced decryption mechanism is combined with
the proposed scheme enabling the users to delegate
most of the computationally expensive cryptographic
operations to the public cloud, thereby reducing the
overhead on the user-side.
6) A formal security analysis of the proposed scheme has
been given demonstrating that the scheme is secure
against the Chosen Plaintext Attacks and the Chosen
Keyword Attacks.
7) A performance analysis of the proposed scheme has
been provided which shows that the proposed scheme is
sufficiently efficient to be used in practical applications.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section II
presents a brief overview of some existing works related
to the proposed scheme. Section III outlines the problem
statement, where the system model, threat model, design and
security goals, frameworks and security model of the proposed
scheme are presented. Section IV gives a brief overview of
the role hierarchy, bilinear pairing properties, a group key
distribution technique, and some mathematical assumptions,
which will be used throughout this paper. Section V details
the proposed scheme including an overview followed by its
main construction. Section VI presents a detailed security and
performance analyses of the proposed scheme, and finally
section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
This section presents a brief overview of some notable
works in the keyword search area, including some crypto-
graphic RBAC based data access control schemes.
A. Keyword Search over Encrypted Data
Data search over encrypted data has been extensively stud-
ied since the past decade. Song et al. presented the first
practical symmetric key cryptography based searchable en-
cryption scheme that can search full text over encrypted data
5In conjunctive keyword search, a user can search for multiple keywords
in a single request [1].
3[17]. Leter, several searchable encryption schemes have been
proposed, for various functionalities and security requirements,
based on either symmetric key cryptography (SKC) [18]–[22]
or public-key cryptography (PKC) [6], [9], [23]–[26].
In [18], Curtmola et al. proposed a SKC based keyword
search scheme for multi-user settings6, which can perform
single keyword search. In [19], Kamara et al. proposed a
dynamic version of the scheme [18] that can add and delete
files at any time efficiently. However, the scheme [19] leaks
significant information while performing update operation
[21]. In [20], Li et al. proposed a SKC based forward search
privacy scheme, which prevents any leakage of information
about the past queries. Later on, in [22], Liu et al. proposed a
keyword search scheme which enables the users to verify the
search results against the dishonest servers. Although the SKC
based keyword search schemes provides better efficiency in
terms computation cost, PKC based keyword search schemes
provide more flexible and expressive search queries [9].
Recently, many PKC based authorized keyword search
schemes have been proposed based on Attribute-Based En-
cryption (ABE) [6], [9], [25]–[27], where any user having
a qualified set of attributes that satisfy an access policy can
perform search operation using some keywords. That is, these
schemes provide authorized keyword search, which allows
only intended users to do the search in multi-user settings. In
[9], [27], Sun et al. and Sultan et al. proposed keyword search
schemes using ABE technique. The schemes provide both
single and conjunctive keyword search without introducing
any additional overhead in the system. In [6], Hu et al.
proposed another ABE based keyword search scheme for
dynamic policy update, where the data owners can securely
update the access policies using proxy re-encryption and secret
sharing techniques. In [25], Miao et al. proposed an ABE
based keyword search scheme for hierarchical data, which also
supports conjunctive keyword search. In [26], Chaudhari et al.
proposed an authorized keyword search scheme using ABE,
which hides the access policy from all the intended entities
including the public cloud. However, all the aforementioned
schemes do not support role hierarchy property and inheritance
property.
B. Cryptographic RBAC based Data Access Control
A cryptographic RBAC based data access control mech-
anism integrates the traditional RBAC model with crypto-
graphic encryption method to enforce RBAC access policy on
encrypted data. It enables the data to be encrypted using RBAC
access policy defined over some role(s). Any user, possessing
the required role(s) satisfying the associated RBAC access
policy is allowed to decrypt the data. Some notable works in
this area are [10], [11], [13], [28]–[32], where [28]–[32] are
based on Hierarchical Key Assignment (HKA) method and
[10], [11], [13] are based on RBE method.
Access control using HKA method has been studied in the
early 1980s. In [28], Akl et al. presented the first cryptographic
6Multi-user settings enable the data owners to authorize any number of
users to perform keyword search operations.
Fig. 1: Proposed System Model
hierarchical access control technique to solve the hierarchi-
cal multi-level security problem, where authorized users are
allowed to possess different access privileges. The users are
grouped into disjoint sets (or classes) and form a hierarchical
structure of classes. Each class is assigned with a unique
encryption key and a public parameter in such a way that
a higher-level class can derive encryption keys of any lower-
level classes using its own encryption key and some public
parameters. Later on, several other hierarchical access control
schemes have been proposed using different techniques, e.g.
[29]–[32]. However, the main drawback of the HKA schemes
is the high complexity in setting up the encryption keys
for a large set of users [10]. Also, the user revocation is a
challenging task, as all the encryption keys that are known to
the revoked users, and their related public parameters need to
update per user revocation which may incur a high overhead
on the system.
In [10], Zhou et al. proposed the first RBE scheme for
data sharing in an untrusted hybrid cloud environment. In
[10], the ciphertexts and secret keys of the users are constant
in size. This scheme also offers user revocation capability.
In [13], Zhu et al. proposed another RBE scheme. In this
scheme, the ciphertext size linearly increases with the number
of roles. In [11], Perez et al. proposed a data-centric RBAC
based data access control mechanism for cloud storage systems
using the concept of proxy re-encryption and identity-based
encryption techniques. To share data with the authorized users,
the data owner generates proxy re-encryption keys based on
some RBAC access policies and keeps the re-encryption keys
along with the ciphertexts in the cloud storage servers. When
an authorized user accesses the ciphertext, the service provider
re-encrypts the ciphertext using the proxy re-encryption keys
based on a RBAC access policy. However, none of [10],
[11], [13] support multi-organization cloud storage systems,
where the same user can possess roles from more than one
independent organizations. Moreover, [10], [11], [13] do not
address keyword search functionality.
4III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section presents the System Model, Threat Model,
Design and Security Goals, Framework, and Security Models
of the proposed scheme.
A. System Model
Figure 1 shows the proposed system model, where the
doted and dark lines represent public channel and secure-
channel such as SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) respectively.
It comprises five entities, namely, System Authorities, Role-
Managers, Data Owners, Users, and Public Cloud having the
following responsibilities:
• System Authority (SA): Each organization has one SA,
which maintains the role hierarchy of that organization.
It generates system public parameters and master secrets
for the organization. SA also maintains all the role-
managers that are associated with the organization, and it
issues secret keys for each role-manager. In addition, SA
issues private and public keys for all the registered users.
Further, it issues private, public and proxy re-encryption
keys to the public cloud. Moreover, SA is responsible for
revoking users from the system when needed.
• Role-Manager (RM): It is an entity of an organization
which manages the role(s). Note that, the roles are as-
signed by the SA. In addition, it also issues and manages
role-keys for the users.
• Data Owners (owners): It is an entity who owns the data
and wants to outsource his/her data to the public cloud.
An owner first encrypts data using a RBAC access policy
before outsourcing to the public cloud. The owner first
encrypts a plaintext data using a random secret key by fol-
lowing any secure symmetric key encryption algorithm,
e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Afterward,
the owner chooses a set of keywords associated with the
plaintext data and encrypts those keywords along with the
random key using the chosen RBAC access policy. The
owner then combines all the ciphertexts into one archive
and outsources it to the cloud storage servers.
• Users: It is an entity who wants to access the outsourced
data. Each user must register with SA(s) to receive private
and public keys associated with the organization(s) from
which he/she wants to access data. Also, a user receives
a unique role-key for each role he/she possesses from the
respective role-manager. When a user wants to access
data, the user computes a trapdoor using his/her private
keys, role-keys, the desired keyword(s) and sends it to
the public cloud.
• Public Cloud: It is a third-party entity which manages
the cloud storage servers. The main responsibility of the
public cloud is to store owners’ encrypted data. Moreover,
it is also responsible for performing keyword search
operation over the encrypted data. It is assumed that the
public cloud correctly performs search operations using
the received trapdoors if and only if the requested user has
proper roles. It is also assumed that it partially decrypts
all the ciphertexts that have a matching keyword(s) with
the trapdoors.
B. Threat Model
Public cloud is considered as an honest-but-curious entity.
That is, public cloud honestly performs all the assigned tasks,
but it may try to gain additional privacy information from the
data available to it. The users may be malicious, and they may
try to collude among themselves to gain access to the data
beyond their access privileges. The users, having insufficient
access rights, may also try to collude with the public cloud
for gaining access to the data beyond their access rights. It is
assumed that all the SAs and RMs are fully trusted entities.
The threat model is supplemented by a Security Model in
Section III-E.
C. Design and Security Goals
The proposed scheme aims to achieve the following func-
tionality and security goals.
Functionality Goals: The proposed scheme should provide
the following functionalities.
1) Authorized Keyword Search: Only the users, having
proper roles according to the defined RBAC access pol-
icy, are authorized to perform keyword search operations
over the encrypted data. That is, any unintended users
should not get access to the encrypted (outsourced) data.
2) Role-Based Data Sharing: Only the users, possessing
the proper roles according to the defined RBAC access
policy, can have access to the plaintext data through the
decryption operation.
3) Role Management by Multiple organizations: The roles
assigned to users can be managed by more than one
organization and can be simultaneously used for data
sharing and keyword search operations.
4) Conjunctive Keyword Search: Users can search for mul-
tiple keywords using a single search request.
5) Outsourced Decryption: Users can delegate most of the
computationally expensive operation to the public cloud
without disclosing any sensitive information.
6) Prior Authentication: The public cloud can authenticate
a user before performing the costly keyword search and
outsourced decryption operations for the user.
7) Revocation: Revocation is supported in two following
ways:
• Complete user revocation: SA can prevent unin-
tended users from accessing its data.
• Role-level user revocation: SA can revoke one or
more roles of a user. The idea is that the revoked
user can no longer use the revoked roles for ac-
cessing data, while the same user should be able to
access data using his/her non-revoked roles if they
are qualified enough according to the RBAC access
policy.
Security Goals: The proposed scheme should fulfil the fol-
lowing security requirements:
1) Data Confidentiality: Any entity, including the public
cloud should not be able to access the plaintext data un-
less they have proper roles satisfying the defined RBAC
access policy. This security notion can be captured by
5TABLE I: NOTATIONS
Notation Description
q a large prime number
G1,GT two cyclic multiplicative groups of order q
H1(.), H2(.) hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q and H2 : G1 → Z∗q
Φ set of system authorities in the system
m total number of system authorities in the system
Ψk set of roles associated with a role hierarchy of the kth system
authority
Γ set of all roles associated with a ciphertext
ΓΦ system authorities associated with a ciphertext
SIDu set of roles associated with the user IDu
rk,i i
th role managed by kth system authority
Rk,i the set of ancestor roles of rk,i
IDu unique identity of the uth user
IDc unique identity of the public cloud
RMrki
role-manager which manages role rki
ts current timestamp
Semantic Security. This security notion is also referred to
as Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attack
(IND-CPA).
2) Keyword Secrecy: Using unqualified search requests or
trapdoors, any entity including the public cloud should
not be able to learn any useful information about the
plaintext keywords associated with the encrypted data.
Similarly, any outsider (neither the requesting user nor
the public cloud) should be able to learn any useful
information about the keywords from the trapdoors.
These two security notions can be captured by Keyword
Semantic Security. This security notion is also referred
to as Indistinguishability against Chosen Keyword Attack
(IND-CKA).
3) Forward and Backward Secrecy: Forward secrecy rep-
resents that any new user having qualified roles should
be able to decrypt the ciphertexts which are encrypted
before he/she joined the system. Backward secrecy
represents that a revoked user should not be able to
decrypt the ciphertexts which are published after his/her
revocation using the revoked roles.
4) Resistance against Replay Attacks: If one or more valid
trapdoor is exposed to an adversary, the adversary should
not be able to launch replay attacks. Many recent
keyword search schemes, e.g., [6], [9] are susceptible
to replay attacks if the trapdoors are exposed, as the
adversary can re-use the exposed trapdoors using a fresh
random number each time she/he wants to perform a
keyword search.
D. Framework
Broadly the proposed scheme is divided into nine main
phases, namely, System Setup, Management of Roles, Public
Cloud Key Generation, New User Enrolment, Role Assignment,
Data Encryption, Trapdoor Generation, Data Search, and
Decryption. SAs initiate the System Setup phase to generate
mutually agreed public parameters and master secret through
the SYSTEMSETUP algorithm. SA performs the Manage of
Role phase to initialize its role hierarchy and generates role
related parameters (both public and secret parameters). It
also generates proxy re-encryption keys for the public cloud.
It consists of the MANAGEROLE algorithm. SA generates
private and public keys for the public cloud in the Public
Cloud Key Generation phase using the PUBCLOUDKEYGEN
algorithm. In the New User Enrolment phase, SA mainly issues
private and public keys for each registered users through the
USERPRIVKEYGEN algorithm. Role-managers perform Role
Assignment phase, where they assign roles in the form of role-
keys to the users based on their responsibilities and profile
in the organization. It consists of the USERROLEKEYGEN
algorithm. In the Data Encryption phase, the owner encrypts
data and associated keywords using a RBAC access policy. It
consists of the ENC algorithm. To perform keyword search
as well as outsourced decryption, the users generate trap-
doors in the Trapdoor Generation phase using the TRAP-
GEN algorithm. The public cloud performs the Data Search
phase, which consists of AUTHENTICATION, KEYSEARCH,
and PARTIALDEC algorithms. In the AUTHENTICATION, the
public cloud authenticates the requesting user and checks
freshness of the keyword search request (i.e., trapdoor) to
prevent any replay attacks. In the KEYSEARCH, the public
cloud performs keyword search operation on the encrypted
data using the received trapdoor. In the PARTIALDEC, the pub-
lic cloud performs outsourced decryption operations. In this
algorithm, the public cloud partially decrypts the ciphertexts
which are returned by the KEYSEARCH algorithm. Finally, the
user performs Decryption phase to decrypt all the partially
decrypted ciphertexts received from the public cloud. This
phase comprises DEC algorithm. A brief overview of the
different algorithms of these phases are explained next. The
notations used in this paper are shown in Table I.
• SYSTEMSETUP
(
(PP, {MSk}∀k∈Φ)← 1Λ
)
: It takes a se-
curity parameter Λ as input. It outputs public parameter
PP and master secret MSk for each SA in the system.
• MANAGEROLE
((
RPk, {PKrki }∀rki ∈Ψk , {RSrki}∀rki ∈Ψk ,{{
PKey
rkw
rki
}
∀rkw∈Rrk
i
\{rki }
}
∀rki ∈Ψk
)
←
(
H, PP
))
: It
takes a role hierarchyH and public parameter PP as input.
It outputs role secret parameter RPk, and for each role
rki ∈ Ψk, it outputs the role public key PKrki , role secret
RSrki and proxy re-encryption keys PKey
rkw
rki
.
• PUBCLOUDKEYGEN
(
(Privkc, Pub
1k
c , Pub
2k
c ) ←
(PP, MSk, IDc)
)
: It takes public parameter PP, master
secret MSk and identity IDc of the public cloud as input.
It outputs a private key Privkc and two public keys
(Pub1kc , Pub
2k
c ) for the public cloud.
• USERPRIVKEYGEN
( (
SKkIDu , Pub
k
IDu
, USIDu
) ←
(MSk, PP, IDu)
)
: It takes master secret MSk, public
parameter PP, and unique identity of a user IDu as input.
It outputs a secret key SKkIDu , a public key Pub
k
IDu
and a
user secret USIDu for the user IDu.
• USERROLEKEYGEN ((RK1,urkx , RK
2,u
rkx
) ←
(PP, USIDu , RSrkx , trkx)): It takes public parameter PP,
user secret USIDu , and role secret RSrkx , role related
secret trkx ∈ Z∗q of rkx as input. It outputs two role-keys
(RK1,urkx
, RK2,urkx
) associated with the role rkx for the user
IDu.
6• ENC
(
CT ← (PP, Pub1kc , Pub2kc , M,W,Γ,ΓΦ)
)
: It takes
public parameter PP, both the public keys (Pub1kc , Pub
2k
c )
of the public cloud, actual plaintext message M, keyword
set W (associated with the actual plaintext message M), a
RBAC access policy Γ, and a set ΓΦ of SAs which are
associated with Γ as input. It outputs a ciphertext CT.
• TRAPGEN ((Trap, v) ←
({RK1,urkx , RK
2,u
rkx
}∀rkx∈SIDu , SKkIDu ,SIDu , w)): It takes both the
role-keys (RK1,urkx , RK
2,u
rkx
), secret key SKkIDu , user role set
SIDu of a user IDu, and keyword w as input. It outputs a
trapdoor Trap and a random number v ∈ Z∗q .
• AUTHENTICATION
( (
V 13 / ⊥
) ←(
{Privkc}∀k∈ΓΦ , Trap, PubkIDu , IDu, ts′
))
: It takes
private keys of the public cloud Privkc issues by all
the system authorities in the set ΓΦ, trapdoor Trap,
public key PubkIDu of a user IDu, identity IDu of the user,
and current timestamp ts′ as input. If the user IDu is
legitimate and the trapdoor was not previously issued, it
outputs V 13 for a successful authentication. Otherwise,
it outputs ⊥ which represents either an unsuccessful
authentication or an invalid trapdoor.
• KEYSEARCH ((CT/ ⊥) ← (CT, Trap, V 31 )): It takes
trapdoor Trap, V 31 and a ciphertext CT as input. It
outputs the ciphertext CT if and only if for all rki ∈ Γ
there is rkx ∈ SIDu such that rkx ∈ Rrki and the keyword w
associated with the trapdoor has a match with a keyword
associated with the ciphertext CT. Otherwise, it outputs
⊥, which represents an unsuccessful search operation.
• PARTIALDEC
(
CT′ ← (CT, Trap, {Privkc}∀k∈ΓΦ ,SIDu)
)
:
It takes the ciphertext CT, trapdoor Trap, private keys
Privkc of the public cloud associated with the system
authorities in ΓΦ, and user role set SIDu as input. It
outputs a partially decrypted ciphertext CT′.
• FULLDEC(M← (CT′, PrivIDu , v)): It takes the partially
decrypted ciphertext CT′, user private key PrivIDu , and
v as input and outputs the actual plaintext message M.
E. Security Model
The two games, namely, Semantic Security against Chosen
Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) and Semantic Security against
Chosen Keyword Attack (IND-CKA) are used to define the
security model of the proposed scheme. These two games are
defined next.
1) Semantic Security against Chosen Plaintext Attack: The
semantic security of the proposed scheme defined on Chosen
Plaintext Attack (CPA) security under Selective-ID Model7.
The CPA security can be illustrated using the following secu-
rity game IND-CPA between a challenger C and an adversary
A1.
INIT Adversary A1 sends a challenged role set Γ∗, a
keyword w and two identities ID∗u , ID
∗
c to the challenger C.
7In the Selective-ID security model, the adversary must submit a set of
challenged roles before starting the security game. This is essential in our
security proof to set up the role public key (please refer Section VI-A for
more details).
SETUP Challenger runs the SYSTEMSETUP algorithm to
generate public parameters and master secrets. Challenger C
generates role public keys, role secrets and proxy re-encryption
keys using the MANAGEROLE algorithm. It also generates
public and private keys using the PUBCLOUDKEYGEN and
USERPRIVKEYGEN algorithms. Challenger C sends the pub-
lic parameter, role public keys, proxy re-encryption keys,
public and private keys to the adversaryA1. It keeps the master
secret and role secrets in a secure place.
PHASE 1 Adversary A1 submits a role set S∗ to the
challenger C for role-keys so that there exits at least one role
rkx ∈ S∗ such that rkx /∈ Rrki , where rki ∈ Γ∗. Challenger C
runs the USERROLEKEYGEN algorithm to generate role-keys
for the adversary A1. Adversary A1 can send queries for the
role-keys to the challenger C by polynomially many times.
CHALLENGE When adversary A1 decides that PHASE 1 is
over, it submits two equal length messages K0 and K1, which
were not challenged before, to the challenger C. Challenger C
flips a random binary coin ω and encrypts message Kω using
the ENC algorithm for the challenged role set Γ∗. Challenger
C sends the encrypted message of Kω to adversary A1.
PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1.
GUESS Adversary A1 outputs a guess ω′ of ω. The
advantage of winning this game for adversary A1 is
AdvIND−CPAA1 =
∣∣Pr[ω′ = ω]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition III.1. The proposed scheme is secure against
chosen plaintext attack if AdvIND−CPAA1 is negligible for any
polynomial time adversary A1.
2) Semantic Security against Chosen Keyword Attack: The
semantic security of the proposed keyword search scheme
defined on Chosen Keyword Attack (CKA) security under
the same Selective ID Model as described in Section III-E1.
The CKA security can be demonstrated using the following
security game IND-CKA between a challenger C and an
adversary A2.
INIT Adversary A2 sends a set of challenged roles Γ∗ and
two identities ID∗u , ID
∗
c to the challenger C.
SETUP Challenger runs the SYSTEMSETUP algorithm to
generate public parameters and master secrets. Challenger C
generates role public keys, role secrets and proxy re-encryption
keys using the MANAGEROLE algorithm. It also generates
public and private keys using PUBCLOUDKEYGEN algorithm
and a public key using USERPRIVKEYGEN algorithm. Chal-
lenger C sends the public parameter, role public keys, proxy
re-encryption keys, public and private keys to the adversary
A2. It keeps the master secret and role secrets in a secure
place.
PHASE 1 Adversary A2 submits a set of roles S∗ and a
keyword w to the challenger C so that there exits at least
one role rkx ∈ S∗ such that rkx /∈ Rrki , where rki ∈ Γ∗.
Challenger initiates the TRAPGEN algorithm to generate a
trapdoor for the adversary A2. Finally, challenger C sends the
generated trapdoor to the adversary A2. Afterwards, adversary
A2 can send queries for the trapdoor to the challenger C by
polynomially many times.
CHALLENGE When adversary A2 decides that PHASE 1
is completed, it submits two equal length keywords w0 and
7(a) Role Hierarchy 1 (b) Role Hierarchy 2
Fig. 2: Sample Role Hierarchy (RH)
w1, which were not challenged before, to the challenger C.
Challenger C flips a binary coin ω and encrypts keyword
wω using the ENC algorithm for the challenged role set Γ∗.
Challenger C sends the encrypted ciphertext of wω to the
adversary A2.
PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1.
GUESS Adversary A2 outputs a guess ω′ of ω. The
advantage of winning this game for adversary A2 is
AdvIND−CKAA2 =
∣∣Pr[ω′ = ω]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition III.2. The proposed scheme is secure against the
chosen keyword attack if AdvIND−CKAA2 is negligible for any
polynomial time adversary A2.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
This section presents an overview of a role hierarchy and
bilinear pairing. It also presents an overview of a group key
distribution mechanism and a mathematical assumption which
is used in this paper.
A. Role Hierarchy notations
In the proposed scheme, roles are organized in a hierarchy
where ancestor roles can inherit access privileges of its de-
scendant roles. Figure 2 shows two sample role hierarchies,
namely Role Hierarchy 1 (Figure 2a) and Role Hierarchy 2
(Figure 2b). We consider Role Hierarchy 1 (Figure 2a) as an
example to define the following notations of a role hierarchy.
• rkr : root role of a role hierarchy. We assume that in any
role hierarchy there can be only one root role.
• Ψk: set of all roles in the role hierarchy. For example,
Ψk = {rkr , rk1 , rk2 , rk3 , rk4 , rk5 , rk6 , rk7 , rk8}
• Rrki : ancestor set of the role r
k
i . For example, Rrk8 ={rkr , rk1 , rk2 , rk4 , rk5 , rk6 , rk7 , rk8},Rrk5 = {rkr , rk1 , rk2 , rk5} and
Rrk6 = {rkr , rk1 , rk2 , rk4 , rk6}.
B. Bilinear Pairing
Let G1 and GT be two cyclic multiplicative groups of order
q. Let g be a generator of G1. The bilinear map eˆ : G1×G1 →
GT has the following properties:
• Bilinear: eˆ
(
ga, gb
)
= eˆ (g, g)
ab, ∀g ∈ G1 and ∀(a, b) ∈
Z∗q
• Non-degenerate: eˆ (g, g) 6= 1
• Computable: eˆ(g, g) is efficiently computable for all g ∈
G1
C. Group Key Distribution
In [33], Burmester et al. proposed a two round group
key distribution scheme using the concept of Diffie-Hellman
assumption. Their scheme works as follows:
Let U = {ID1, ID2, ..., IDn} be the group of n users.
Suppose the users are arranged into a cycle. To compute a
group key among the users, each user IDi ∈ U selects a
random secret number ai ∈ Z∗q and broadcasts xi = gai
where g is a generator of group G1. Afterward, it publishes
Xi = (
xi+1
xi−1
)ai . Finally, each user IDi in the group computes
a common key CK = ga1·a2+a2·a3+...+an·a1 without knowing
others’ secrets and without disclosing the common key to any
other unintended entities.
D. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
Let G1 and GT be two cyclic multiplicative groups of order
q. Let g be a generator of G1 and eˆ : G1 × G1 → GT be
an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map. The
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption is
defined as follows: No probabilistic polynomial time adversary
is able to distinguish the tuples
〈
g, ga, gb, gc, Z = eˆ (g, g)
abc
〉
and
〈
g, ga, gb, gc, Z = eˆ (g, g)
z〉 with non-negligible advan-
tage, where (a, b, c, z) ∈ Z∗q are randomly chosen.
V. PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents the proposed scheme in details. First, a
brief overview of the proposed scheme is presented, followed
by its main construction.
A. Overview
The main goal of the proposed scheme is to enable the
owners to enforce RBAC access policies on the encrypted
data so that only the users with the authorized roles can
perform the keyword search along with efficient data decryp-
tion. To achieve this, the proposed scheme devises a novel
RBE technique that enables only the users having authorized
roles satisfying the specified RBAC access policy to delegate
the keyword search capability to the public cloud without
disclosing any sensitive information. To reduce decryption
cost at the user side, the devised RBE technique also enables
the authorized users to delegate computationally expensive
cryptographic operations to the public cloud.
In the proposed scheme, each organization is allowed to
maintain its own role hierarchy, and each role hierarchy is
associated with a Role-Key Hierarchy (RKH). In Figure 3, a
sample RKH is shown. Each node in a RKH represents a role,
and each role, say rki , is associated with a role public key, say
PKrki . In addition, each role is associated with a set of users
who hav
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In the proposed scheme, each organization is allowed to
maintain its own role hierarchy, and each role hierarchy is
associated with a Role-Key Hierarchy (RKH). In Figure 3, a
sample RKH is shown. Each node in a RKH represents a role,
and each role (except the root role), say rki , is associated with a
role public key, say PKrki . In addition, each role (except the root
role) is associated with a set of users who have that role, and
the users are assigned with a unique pair of role-keys for each
role they possess8. The role-keys are generated in such a way
that the user can use them to compute trapdoors to perform
a keyword search over the ciphertexts, which are encrypted
using a role public key of any descendent role. The same
trapdoor can also be used to perform the outsourced decryption
operation. This in turn enables the users to gain access to the
actual plaintext data. This process is illustrated as follows.
Let us assume that the owner wants to authorize all the users
having access privileges for the role rk5 to have access to data.
The owner encrypts the data and the associated keywords using
the role public key PKrk5 . Any user who possesses any one of
the roles in Rrk5 = {rkr , rk1 , rk2 , rk3 , rk5} can search and decrypt
the encrypted data using their respective role-keys. That is,
the user possesses a qualified role for accessing the ciphertext.
Similarly, if the owner encrypts data and associated keywords
using the role public keys PKrk1 and PKrk4 , then any user who
possesses roles in Rrk1 = {rkr , rk1} and Rrk4 = {rkr , rk1 , rk2 , rk4}
respectively can perform keyword search and data decryption
using their respective role-keys.
To support multi-organization data sharing, the proposed
scheme takes advantage of an existing group key distribution
8In our proposed scheme, the root role (rkr ) is not assigned to any users
and is internally managed by the SA. As such, we do not consider any user
set with the root role in Figure 3. More details are given in the following
sections.
protocol to generate a common master secret for all the
participating organizations. This master secret is used for
generating the system parameters, including public parameters
and master secrets of each organizations. This allows a user to
possess more than one role from different organizations. More
details are given in the following subsection.
B. Construction
A detailed description of all the phases of the proposed
scheme is presented as follows.
1) System Setup: In this phase, the system authority of each
organization mutually publishes the system public parameter,
and they generate their own master secrets. This phase consists
of the SYSTEMSETUP algorithm which is defined next.
a) SYSTEMSETUP
(
(PP, {MSk}∀k∈Φ)← 1Λ
)
: It chooses
two cyclic multiplicative bilinear groups G1 and GT of order
q, where q is a large prime number. It also chooses a generator
g ∈ G1, random numbers {ηk, µk, xk}∀k∈Φ ∈ Z∗q and two hash
functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 : G1 → Z∗q . Afterward, all
the system authorities follow a group key generation protocol,
as described in Section IV-C, to compute a shared secret gy ,
where y = y1 · y2 + y2 · y3 + ... + ym · y1 and m is the
total number of system authorities. Afterward, it computes
Y = eˆ(g, g)y and hk1 = g
ηk , and then publishes the system
public parameter PP =
〈
G1,GT , g, eˆ, H1, H2, Y, {hk1}∀k∈Φ
〉
.
Each system authority, say kth system authority SAk, keeps
master secret MSk = 〈gy, ηk, µk, xk〉 in a secure place.
Remark 1. All the system authorities can check validity of Y
by comparing eˆ(gy, g) ?= Y . Also, any number of new system
authorities can be added in the system at any time by sharing
the existing group secret key, i.e., gy .
92) Management of Roles: In this phase, a system authority
generates the role related parameters. Suppose the system
authority SAk wants to initialize a role hierarchyH. The system
authority SAk generates role secrets RSrki and role public keys
PKrki for each role r
k
i associated with H. It also computes
proxy re-encryption keys {PKeyrkx
rki
}rkx∈Rrk
i
\{rki } for each role
rki (except the root role) associated with the role hierarchy
H. It stores the role public keys in its public bulletin board
and keeps the role secrets in a secure place. It also shares
each role secret to its corresponding role-manager. That is,
the role secret associated with rki , i.e., RSrki is shared with
the role-manager which manages rki , i.e., RMrki . Moreover, the
proxy re-encryption keys are sent to the proxy-server (i.e.,
public cloud) using secure-channels. This phase consists of
the MANAGEROLE algorithm which is defined next.
a) MANAGEROLE
((
RPk, {PKrki }∀rki ∈Ψk , {RSrki}∀rki ∈Ψk ,{{
PKey
rkw
rki
}
∀rkw∈Rrk
i
\{rki }
}
∀rki ∈Ψk
)
←
(
H, PP
))
: It selects
random numbers {trki }∀rki ∈Ψk ∈ Z∗q . It computes role
secrets RSrki , role public key PKrki =
〈
PKrki , r
k
i ,Rrki
〉
and
proxy re-encryption key {PKeyrkw
rki
}∀rkw∈Rrk
i
\{rki } for each role
rki ∈ (Ψk \ {rkr}), where
RSrki =
∏
∀rkj ∈Rrk
i
trkj
PKrki =g
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j
PKey
rkw
rki
=
∏
∀rkj ∈Rrk
i
\{rkw}
trkj
(1)
Rrki is the set of ancestor roles of r
k
i and role secret parameter
RPk =
〈
{trki }∀rki ∈Ψk
〉
. The system authority sends each secret
role parameter and role secret associated with a role to the
role-manager which is responsible of its management. For
example, secret role parameter trki and role secret RSrki are
shared with the role-manager RMrki . Note that the root role
is internally managed by the system authority. As such, no
proxy re-encryption key, role secret key, role public key are
generated for the root role.
3) Public Cloud Key Generation: In this phase, a system
authority generates keys for the public cloud. Let the system
authority SAk wants to issue keys for the public cloud. It
computes a private key Privkc, two public keys (Pub
1k
c , Pub
2k
c )
and sends the private key Privkc to the public cloud using a
secure-channel. It stores both the public keys (Pub1kc , Pub
2k
c )
in its public bulletin board. This phase consists of the PUB-
CLOUDKEYGEN algorithm which is defined next.
a) PUBCLOUDKEYGEN
(
(Privkc, Pub
1k
c , Pub
2k
c ) ←
(PP, MSk, IDc)
)
: It computes a private key Privkc and two
public keys (Pub1kc , Pub
2k
c ) for the public cloud as follows:
Privkc =H2
(
(gy)
H1(IDc)
xk
)
= H2
(
g
y·H1(IDc)
xk
)
Pub1kc =g
µk·Privkc
Pub2kc =g
xk·Privkc (2)
4) New User Enrolment: A system authority initiates this
phase when a new legitimate user, say IDu, wants to join an
organization, say kth organization. The system authority SAk
generates a secret key SKkIDu and public key Pub
k
IDu
for the user
IDu. It also generates a user secret USIDu which is shared with
all the role-managers under its control. SAk sends the secret
key SKkIDu to the user IDu using a secure-channel and keeps
the public key PubkIDu in its public bulletin board. This phase
comprises the USERPRIVKEYGEN algorithm which is defined
next.
a) USERPRIVKEYGEN
( (
SKkIDu , Pub
k
IDu
, USIDu
) ←
(MSk, PP, IDu)
)
: It issues a pair of secret key
SKkIDu =
〈
PrivIDu , Priv
k
IDu
〉
, public key PubkIDu , and a
user secret USIDu as follows:
PrivIDu =H2
(
(gy)H1(IDu)
)
= H2
(
gy·H1(IDu)
)
PrivkIDu = (g
y)
PrivIDu
ηk · g
xk
ηk = g
y·PrivIDu+xk
ηk
PubkIDu =g
H2(PrivkIDu)
PrivIDu
USIDu =(g
y)PrivIDu · gµk = gy·PrivIDu+µk (3)
Note that all the system authorities compute the same private
key PrivIDu for the user IDu. Hence, the user IDu needs to
keep only one copy of it.
5) Role Assignment: In this phase, a role-manager assigns
roles to a legitimate user. Suppose the role-manager RMrkx wants
to assign a role rkx to the user IDu. To do so, RMrkx computes two
role-keys (RK1,urkx , RK
2,u
rkx
) for the user IDu and sends the role-
keys to the user IDu using a secure-channel. This phase com-
prises the USERROLEKEYGEN algorithm which is described
next.
a) USERROLEKEYGEN ((RK1,urkx , RK
2,u
rkx
) ←
(PP, USIDu , RSrkx , trkx)): Let’s say, user IDu is assigned
with the role rkx. RMrkx computes the role-keys RK
1,u
rkx
and RK2,urkx
as follows:
RK
1,u
rkx
= (USIDu)
1
RS
rkx = g
y·PrivIDu+µk∏
rk
j
∈R
rkx
t
rk
j
RK
2,u
rkx
= (USIDu)
1
t
rkx = g
y·PrivIDu+µk
t
rkx (4)
6) Data Encryption: In this phase, the owner encrypts
the plaintext data and then outsources the encrypted data
to the cloud storage servers. The owner first encrypts the
plaintext data using a random symmetric key by following a
secure symmetric key encryption algorithm (e.g., Advanced
Encryption Standards). The owner then chooses a set of
keywords associated with the actual plaintext data and encrypts
the chosen keywords along with the symmetric key using
our proposed ENC algorithm. Finally, the owner combines
both ciphertexts (i.e., symmetric key and actual plaintext data
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components) into one archive and outsources the archive file
to the public cloud. The ENC algorithm is defined as follows:
a) ENC
(
CT ← (PP, Pub1kc , Pub2kc , M,W,Γ,ΓΦ)
)
: Let
an owner of the kth organization wants to share a plaintext
message M with the users who possess access rights for the
roles in Γ. Let w be a keyword from the keyword space
W. First, the owner chooses a random number K ∈ GT
and encrypts the plaintext message M using K by following
a symmetric key encryption algorithm. Afterward, the owner
encrypts the random number K along with the keyword w using
the role public parameters of the roles in Γ.
The owner chooses random numbers ({drki , d′rki }∀rki ∈Γ) ∈
Z∗q , where di =
∑
rki ∈Γ drki , dj =
∑
rki ∈Γ d
′
rki
and d = di+dj .
The owner also computes {dk =
∑
∀rki ∈(Γ∩Ψk) drki }∀k∈ΓΦ
and {d′k =
∑
∀rki ∈(Γ∩Ψk) d
′
rki
}∀k∈ΓΦ . Finally,
the owner generates a ciphertext CT =〈
EncK(M), C1, C2, C3, {C4k, C ′4k}∀k∈ΓΦ , {Crki , C ′rki }∀rki ∈Γ,Γ,ΓΦ
〉
for the plaintext message M, where:
C1 =K · Y d = K · eˆ(g, g)y·d
C2 =(h
k
1)
dj = gηk·dj
C3 =(Pub
2k
c )
dj = gxk·Priv
k
c·dj
C4k =
(
Pub1kc
)dk = gµk·Privkc·dk
C ′4k =
(
Pub1kc
)d′k = gµk·Privkc·d′k
Crki =
(
PKrki
)d
rk
i
·H1(w)
= g
H1(w)·drk
i
∏
rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j
C ′rki =
(
PKrki
)d′
rk
i
·H1(w)
= g
H1(w)·d′
rk
i
∏
rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j (5)
Note that the data owner embeds the hashed value of the
keyword, i.e, H1(w) for some roles in Γ only (this fixed
position can be seen as part of the public parameter).
7) Trapdoor Generation: In this phase, a user generates
trapdoor Trap using his/her secret keys and the keywords
of his/her choice for delegating keyword search capabilities
to the public cloud. The user sends the trapdoor Trap along
with the associated roles to the public cloud using a secure-
channel. This phase comprises the TRAPGEN algorithm which
is described next.
a) TRAPGEN ((Trap, v) ←
({RK1,urkx , RK
2,u
rkx
}∀rkx∈SIDu , SKkIDu ,SIDu , w)): Suppose the
user IDu who possesses roles SIDu wants to access the
ciphertexts associated with the keyword w of the kth
organization. User IDu chooses a random secret v ∈ Z∗q ,
current timestamp ts, and then he computes a trapdoor
Trap =
〈
tr1, tr2, tr3, tr4, {tr1rkx , tr
2
rkx
}∀rkx∈SIDu ,SIDu , ts
〉
,
where:
tr1 =
[
PrivIDu + ts
H2
(
PrivkIDu
)] v = [PrivIDu + ts] v
H2
(
PrivkIDu
)
tr2 =
(
PrivkIDu
)v
= g
[y·PrivIDu+xk]·v
ηk
tr3 =g
v
PrivIDu
tr4 =g
v
tr1rkx =
(
RK
1,u
rkx
) v
H1(w)
= g
[y·PrivIDu+µk]v
H1(w)·
∏
rk
j
∈R
rkx
t
rk
j
tr2rkx =
(
RK
2,u
rkx
) v
H1(w)
= g
[y·PrivIDu+µk]v
H1(w)·trkx (6)
The user IDu keeps the random secret v in a secure place for
decryption of the ciphertexts in Section V-B9.
8) Data Search: In this phase, the public cloud performs a
keyword search operation on the ciphertexts using the trapdoor
received from the requested user IDu. This phase consists
of the AUTHENTICATION, KEYSEARCH and PARTIALDEC
algorithms. In the AUTHENTICATION algorithm, the public
cloud authenticates the user and checks freshness of the
keyword search request. In the KEYSEARCH algorithm, the
public cloud performs all the search related operation for
finding the ciphertexts which have a matching keyword with
the trapdoor received from the user IDu. This will be done
if and only if the user is legitimate and the keyword search
request is valid. In the PARTIALDEC algorithm, the public
cloud partially decrypts the ciphertexts and finally sends the
partially decrypted ciphertexts to the user IDu. The details of
these algorithms are given next.
a) AUTHENTICATION
( (
V 13 / ⊥
) ←(
{Privkc}∀k∈ΓΦ , Trap, PubkIDu , IDu, ts′
))
: Before performing
computationally expensive operations, the public cloud first
authenticates the requesting user. During the authentication
process, the public cloud also checks the freshness of
search request by comparing the timestamp ts associated
with the trapdoor to its own current timestamp ts′ for
preventing replay attacks. If the authentication fails or if
the timestamp associated with the trapdoor represents a past
time, the public cloud aborts the connection, i.e., returns ⊥.
Otherwise, it performs keyword search operations defined
in the KEYSEARCH algorithm. To authenticate the user and
check the freshness of the request, the public cloud computes
U ′, V 11 , V
2
1 and V
3
1 , based on its known {Privkc}∀k∈ΓΦ ) keys,
where:
U ′ =
∏
∀k∈ΓΦ
(C ′4k)
1
Privkc
=
∏
∀k∈ΓΦ
(
gµk·Priv
k
c·d′k
) 1
Privkc
=g
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d
′
k (7)
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V 11 =eˆ
((
PubkIDu
)tr1
, U ′
)
=eˆ
(gH2(PrivkIDu)PrivIDu )
[PrivIDu+ts]v
H2(PrivkIDu)
, g
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d
′
k

=eˆ
(
gv, g
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d
′
k
)
· eˆ
(
g
v·ts
PrivIDu , g
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d
′
k
)
=eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d
′
k · eˆ (g, g)
v·ts∑∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d′k
PrivIDu (8)
V 21 =eˆ
(
(tr3)
ts, U ′
)
=eˆ
(
g
v·ts
PrivIDu , g
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d
′
k
)
=eˆ (g, g)
v·ts∑∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d′k
PrivIDu (9)
V 31 =eˆ (tr4, U
′)
=eˆ
(
gv, g
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d
′
k
)
=eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d
′
k (10)
Now, the public cloud checks whether V 11
?
= V 21 · V 31 . If
the equation holds, the public cloud performs the operations
defined in the KEYSEARCH algorithm. Otherwise, it aborts
the connection.
Proof of consistency:
V 11 =eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d
′
k · eˆ (g, g)
v·ts∑∀k∈ΓΦ µk·d′k
PrivIDu
=V 31 · V 21 (11)
b) KEYSEARCH ((CT/ ⊥) ← (CT, Trap, V 31 )): Sup-
pose the user IDu possesses a role set SIDu and wants
to access the kth organization’s data. Suppose CT =〈
EncK(M), C1, C2, C3, {C4k, C ′4k}∀k∈ΓΦ , {Crki , C ′rki }∀rki ∈Γ,Γ,
ΓΦ
〉
is the ciphertext of the kth organization on which the
public cloud wants to perform the keyword search operation,
where for all rki ∈ Γ, there is at least one rkx ∈ SIDu such that
rkx ∈ Rrki .
The public cloud computes V 1rkx and V2. While computing
V 1rkx
, two cases are considered which are as follows:
Case 1: if rkx == r
k
i , then
V 1rkx =eˆ
(
tr1rkx , C
′
rki
)
=eˆ
g [y·PrivIDu+µk]vH1(w)·∏rkj ∈Rrkx trkj , gH1(w)·d′rki ∏rkj ∈Rrki trkj

=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu+µk]·v·d′rk
i ,
(
as Rrkx = Rrki
)
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·d′rk
i · eˆ (g, g)µk·v·d
′
rk
i (12)
Otherwise, Case 2: if rkx ∈
(
Rrki \ {rki }
)
(let γ =
[y · PrivIDu + µk])
V 1rkx =eˆ
((
tr2rkx
)PKeyrkx
rki , C ′rki
)
=eˆ
(
g
γ·v
H1(w)·trkx
· 1∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
\{rkx}
t
rk
j , g
H1(w)·d′
rk
i
∏
rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j
)
=eˆ
(
g
γ·v∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j , g
d′
rk
i
∏
rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j
)
=eˆ (g, g)
γ·v·d′
rk
i
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu+µk]v·d′rk
i
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·d′rk
i · eˆ (g, g)µk·v·d
′
rk
i (13)
V2 =
∏
V 1rkx
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·
∑
d′
rk
i · eˆ (g, g)v
∑
µk·d′rk
i
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·dj · eˆ (g, g)v
∑
µk·d′rk
i (14)
Now, the public cloud computes V3, where
V3 =
V2
V 31
=
eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·dj · eˆ (g, g)v
∑
µk·d′rk
i
eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
µk·d′k
=eˆ (g, g)
y·PrivIDu ·dj ·v (15)
Note that eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
µk·drk
i = eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
µk·d′k (Please refer
Section V-B6).
Afterward, the public cloud computes V4, V5 and V6, where
V4 =eˆ (tr2, C2)
=eˆ
(
g
[y·PrivIDu+xk]·v
ηk , gηk·dj
)
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu+xk]·v·dj
=eˆ (g, g)
y·PrivIDu ·v·dj · eˆ (g, g)xk·v·dj (16)
V5 =eˆ
(
(tr4)
1
Privkc , C3
)
=eˆ
(
g
v
Privkc , gxk·Priv
k
c·dj
)
=eˆ (g, g)
xk·v·dj (17)
V6 =
V1
V2
=
eˆ (g, g)
y·PrivIDu ·v·dj · eˆ (g, g)xk·v·dj
eˆ (g, g)
xk·v·dj
=eˆ (g, g)
y·PrivIDu ·dj ·v (18)
Finally, the public cloud compares the equations (15) and
(18). If both are equal then it performs the operations defined
in the PARTIALDEC algorithm (described in Section V-B8c).
Otherwise, it aborts all the operations and outputs ⊥, which
means that the ciphertext does not have the desired keyword.
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c) PARTIALDEC
(
CT′ ← (CT, Trap, {Privkc}∀k∈ΓΦ ,SIDu)
)
:
In this algorithm, the public cloud partially
decrypts all the ciphertexts returned by the
KEYSEARCH algorithm. Suppose ciphertext CT =〈
EncK(M), C1, C2, C3, {C4k, C ′4k}∀k∈ΓΦ , {Crki , C ′rki }∀rki ∈Γ,Γ,ΓΦ
〉
has a matching keyword with the trapdoor Trap. To partially
decrypt the ciphertext CT, the public cloud first computes V 7rkx
and V7. Similar to V 1rkx , the computation procedure considers
the two following cases to compute V 7rkx :
Case 1: if rkx == r
k
i , then
V 7rkx =eˆ
(
tr1rkx , Crki
)
=eˆ
g [y·PrivIDu+µk]vH1(w)·∏rkj ∈Rrkx trkj , gH1(w)·drki ∏rkj ∈Rrki trkj

=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu+µk]·v·drk
i ,
(
as Rrkx = Rrki
)
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·drk
i · eˆ (g, g)µk·v·drki (19)
Otherwise, Case 2: if rkx ∈
(
Rrki \ {rki }
)
(let γ =
[y · PrivIDu + µk])
V 7rkx =eˆ
((
tr2rkx
)PKeyrkx
rki , Crki
)
=eˆ
(
g
γ·v
H1(w)·trkx
· 1∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
\{rkx}
t
rk
j , g
H1(w)·drk
i
∏
rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j
)
=eˆ
(
g
γ·v∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j , g
d
rk
i
∏
rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j
)
=eˆ (g, g)
γ·v·d
rk
i
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu+µk]v·drk
i
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·drk
i · eˆ (g, g)µk·v·drki (20)
V7 =
∏
V 7rkx
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·
∑
d
rk
i · eˆ (g, g)v
∑
µk·drk
i
=eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·di · eˆ (g, g)v
∑
µk·drk
i (21)
The public cloud knowing its private key {Privkc}∀k∈ΓΦ
computes U and V8, as follows:
U =
∏
∀k∈ΓΦ
(C4k)
1
Privkc
=
∏
∀k∈ΓΦ
(
gµk·Priv
k
c·dk
) 1
Privkc
=g
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·dk
V8 =eˆ (tr4, U)
=eˆ
(
gv, g
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·dk
)
=eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
∀k∈ΓΦ µk·dk (22)
Now, the public cloud computes V9, where:
V9 =
V7
V8
=
eˆ (g, g)
[y·PrivIDu ]v·di · eˆ (g, g)v
∑
µk·drk
i
eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
µk·dk
=eˆ (g, g)
y·PrivIDu ·di·v (23)
Note that eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
µk·drk
i = eˆ (g, g)
v
∑
µk·dk (Please refer
Section V-B6).
The public cloud computes V9, where:
V10 =V6 · V9
=eˆ (g, g)
y·PrivIDu ·dj ·v · eˆ (g, g)y·PrivIDu ·di·v
=eˆ (g, g)
y·PrivIDu ·v[dj+di]
=eˆ (g, g)
y·PrivIDu ·v·d (24)
Finally, the public cloud sends the partially decrypted cipher-
text CT′ = 〈EncK(M), C1, V10〉 to the user IDu.
9) Decryption: In this phase, the user IDu decrypts the re-
ceived partially decrypted ciphertext CT′ using his/her private
key PrivIDu and random secret v. This phase comprises the
FULLDEC algorithm which is described next.
a) FULLDEC(M ← (CT′, PrivIDu , v)): It computes K
from the ciphertext CT′ using his/her secret keys, privIDu
and v.
K =
C1
(V10)
1
PrivIDu
·v
=
K · eˆ (g, g)y·d(
eˆ (g, g)
y·PrivIDu ·v·d
) 1
PrivIDu
·v
=
K · eˆ (g, g)y·d
eˆ (g, g)
y·d (25)
Finally, user IDu gets the actual plaintext data by decrypting
EncK(M) using K and removes the random secret v from his/her
database.
C. Conjunctive Keyword Search
Many times a user wants to perform multiple keyword
search using a single search request instead of sending mul-
tiple single keyword search requests. This property is called
the Conjunctive Keyword Search. The proposed scheme can
provide conjunctive keyword search with the following mod-
ifications. The owner computes modified ciphertext compo-
nents Crki =
(
PKrki
)d
rk
i
·∏H1(wi)
= g
d
rk
i
∏
H1(wi)·
∏
rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j
and C ′
rki
=
(
PKrki
)d′
rk
i
·∏H1(wi)
= g
d′
rk
i
∏
H1(wi)·
∏
rk
j
∈R
rk
i
t
rk
j .
Similarly, a user computes trapdoor components tr1rkx =(
RK
1,u
rkx
) v∏
H1(wi) and tr2rkx =
(
RK
2,u
rkx
) v∏
H1(wi) . It can be ob-
served that, our conjunctive keyword search mechanism does
not introduce any additional overhead in the system.
D. Revocation
In the proposed scheme, a SA can revoke a user in two ways,
namely complete user revocation and role-level revocation.
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The former revocation method means that the user can no
longer access any data belonging to that organization. The
later revocation method represents that if one or more roles of
a user is revoked, the user can still access data with his/her
non-revoked roles if they are qualified enough according to
the RBAC access policy.
The complete user revocation is achieved by revoking the
public key PubkIDu of the user, so that the public cloud do
not use it during the authentication process in the AUTHEN-
TICATION algorithm defined in Section V-B8a. To do that, SA
removes the pubic key PubkIDu of the revoked user IDu from
its public bulletin board, which can be done easily.
For the role-level revocation, the SA updates all the param-
eters related with the revoked role. Suppose the SA wants
to revoke a role rki from one or more users. To do that,
the SA first chooses a fresh random number t′
rki
∈ Z∗q and
updates all the parameters related with the revoked role rki .
The SA computes updated public keys
(
PKrkj
) t′rki
t
rk
i , role secrets(
RSrkj ·
t′
rk
i
t
rk
i
)
and proxy re-encryption keys
(
PKey
rkw
rkj
·
t′
rk
i
t
rk
i
)
related with the revoked role rki (i.e., for all r
k
j such that
rki ∈ Rrkj ), where trki is the previously chosen random number
associated with rki . The SA then sends the
t′
rk
i
t
rk
i
to the public
cloud for re-encryption of the stored ciphertexts associated
with the revoked role rki . It also sends
t′
rk
i
t
rk
i
to the corresponding
role-managers for updating the role-keys associated with the
revoked role rki .
The public cloud re-encrypts the ciphertext components(
Crkj
) t′rki
t
rk
i and
(
C ′
rkj
) t′rki
t
rk
i for all rkj such that r
k
i ∈ Rrkj . This
is essential to prevent the revoked users from accessing the
data using the revoked role (i.e., Backward Secrecy).
Moreover, to enable the other non-revoked users for access-
ing the re-encrypted ciphertexts, the concerned role-managers
need to send updated role-keys to the non-revoked users (i.e.,
Forward Secrecy). The updated role-keys are computed as
follows: i)
(
RK
1,u
rki
) trki
t′
rk
i for all the non-revoked users who
possess rki and ii)
(
RK
2,u
rkj
) trki
t′
rk
i for all the non-revoked users
who possess rkj , such that r
k
i ∈ Rrkj .
VI. ANALYSIS
This section first presents security analysis of the proposed
scheme, followed by its performance analysis. In the secu-
rity analysis, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme is
secure against chosen plaintext and chosen keyword attacks.
In the performance analysis, we present a comprehensive
performance analysis of the proposed scheme along with its
experimental results.
A. Security Analysis
1) Security against Chosen Plaintext Attack: CPA security
of the proposed scheme can be defined by the following
theorem and proof.
Theorem 2. If a probabilistic-polynomial time (PPT) adver-
sary A1 wins the CPA security game as defined in Section
III-E1 with a non-negligible advantage , then a PPT simulator
B can be constructed to break the DBDH assumption with
non-negligible advantage 2 .
Proof. In this proof, we show that a simulator B can be
constructed to help an adversary A1 to gain advantage 2
against our proposed scheme.
The DBDH challenger C chooses random numbers
(a, b, c, z) ∈ Z∗q and flips a binary random coin l. It sets
Z = eˆ (g, g)
abc if l = 0 and Z = eˆ (g, g)z otherwise.
Afterwards, challenger C sends A = ga, B = gb, C = gc and
Z to the simulator B, and it asks the simulator B to output l.
Now simulator B acts as a challenger in the rest of the security
game.
In the following game, simulator B interacts with the
adversary A1 as follows:
INIT Adversary A1 sends a challenged role set Γ∗, a
keyword w and two identities (ID∗u , ID
∗
c) to the simulator B.
SETUP Simulator B chooses random numbers
{ζk, ϑk, %k}∀k∈Φ ∈ Z∗q . It also chooses random
numbers {αrki }∀i∈Ψk,∀k∈Φ ∈ Z∗q . Simulator B
computes Y = eˆ (g, g)ab = eˆ (A,B) , {hk1 =
gb·ζk = Bζk}∀k∈Φ. Simulator B also computes
PKrki = g
b
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j = B
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j for all rki ∈ Ψk,
where 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Moreover, simulator B computes
{
PKey
rkw
rki
=
∏
∀rkj ∈Rrk
i
\{rkw} αrkj
}
∀rkw∈Rrk
i
\{rki }

∀rki ∈Ψk
where 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
Simulator B also chooses a random number sID∗u ∈ Z∗q
and computes hid∗c = H1(ID
∗
c). It then computes
{Privkc, Pub1kc , Pub2kc , PrivkIDu , PubkIDu}∀k∈Φ and PrivIDu ,
where
Privkc =H2
(
g
a·b·hid∗c
b·%k
)
= H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
Pub1kc =g
b·ϑk·Privkc = Bϑk·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
Pub2kc =g
b·%k·Privkc = B%k·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
PrivkIDu =g
a·b·sID∗u +b·%k
b·ζk = A
sID∗u
ζk · g
%k
ζk
PubkIDu =g
H2(PrivkIDu)
sID∗u = g
H2
A
sID∗u
ζk ·g
%k
ζk

sID∗u
PrivIDu =sID∗u (26)
Finally, simulator B sends the follow-
ing parameters to the adversary A1:〈
q,G1,GT , eˆ, H1, H2, Y, {hk1}∀k∈Φ, {{PKrki}∀rki ∈Ψk}∀k∈Φ,{{
PKey
rkw
rki
}
∀rkw∈Rrk
i
\{rki }
}
∀rki ∈Ψk,∀k∈Φ
〉
. Simulator B also
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sends {Privkc, Pub1kc , Pub2kc , PrivkIDu , PubkIDu}∀k∈Φ and
PrivIDu to the adversary A. Note that simulator B sends a
random number sID∗u as PrivIDu to the adversary A. As the
simulator B chooses sID∗u in the SETUP and sends it to the
adversary A, the simulated game remains the same as the
original scheme.
PHASE 1 Adversary sends a challenged role set S∗
to the simulator B for role-keys. Simulator B computes
{RK1,urkx , RK
2,u
rkx
}∀rkx∈S∗ as follows:
For all rkx ∈ S∗, simulator B computes
RK
1,u
rkx
=g
a·b·PrivIDu+b·ϑk
b
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rkx
α
rk
j = A
H2
(
A
hid∗u
)
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rkx
α
rk
j · g
ϑk∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rkx
α
rk
j
RK
2,u
rkx
=g
a·b·PrivIDu+b·ϑk
b·α
rkx = A
H2
(
A
hid∗u
)
α
rkx · g
ϑk
α
rkx (27)
Finally, simulator B sends {RK1,urkx , RK
2,u
rkx
}∀rkx∈S∗ to the adver-
sary A1. Note that distribution of the role-keys for S∗ is
identical to the original scheme.
CHALLENGE When adversary A1 decides that PHASE 1 is
over, it submits two equal length messages K0 and K1 to the
simulator B. Simulator B flips a random binary coin ω and
encrypts Kω with the challenged role set Γ∗.
Simulator B first computes hw = H1(w) and chooses five
polynomials q1(x), q2(x), q3(x), q4(x) and q5(x) of degree
2, |Γ∗Φ|, |Γ∗Φ|, |Γ∗| and |Γ∗| respectively, where Γ∗Φ represents
the set of system authorities associated with Γ∗, as follows:
• q1(x): Simulator B implicitly sets q1(0) = c and ran-
domly chooses the rest of the points to define the polyno-
mial q1(x) completely. Note that q1(1) and q1(2) values
implicitly represent di and dj of our original scheme
respectively.
• q2(x): Simulator B sets q2(0) = q1(1) and randomly
chooses the rest of the points to define q2(x) completely.
• q3(x): Simulator B sets q3(0) = q1(2) and randomly
chooses the rest of the points to defined q3(x) completely.
• q4(x): Simulator B sets q4(0) = q1(1) and randomly
chooses the rest of the points to define q4(x) completely.
• q5(x): Simulator B sets q5(0) = q1(2) and randomly
chooses the rest of the points to define q5(x) completely.
Now, simulator B computes a challenged ciphertext CTω =
〈
C1, C2, C3, {C4k, C ′4k}∀k∈Γ∗Φ , {Crki , C ′rki }∀rki ∈Γ∗
〉
, where
C1 =Kω · Z
C2 =g
b·ζk·q1(2) = Bζk·q1(2)
C3 =g
b·%k·Privkc·q1(2) = B%k·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
·q1(2)
C4k =g
b·ϑk·Privkc·q2(i)
=Bϑk·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
·q2(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ∗Φ|
C ′4k =g
b·ϑk·Privkc·q3(i)
=Bϑk·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
·q3(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ∗Φ|
Crki =g
hw·b·q4(i)
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j , 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ∗|
=B
hw·q4(i)
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j
C ′rki =g
hw·b·q5(i)
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j , 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ∗|
=B
hw·q5(i)
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j (28)
Note that c (implicitly) can be recovered using the La-
grange’s polynomial interpolation from the values q1(1) and
q1(2), and q1(1), q1(2) can be recovered from the polynomials
q4(x) and q5(x) if and only if the entity (i.e., adversary A1)
possesses a qualified set of roles. Hence, the distribution of
the ciphertext CTω for Γ∗ is identical to the original scheme.
PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1
GUESS The adversary A1 guesses a bit ω′ which is sent to
simulator B. If ω′ = ω then the adversary A1 wins CPA game;
otherwise it fails. If ω′ = ω, simulator B answers “DBDH” in
the game (i.e. outputs l = 0); otherwise B answers “random”
(i.e. outputs l = 1).
If Z = eˆ(g, g)z; then C1 is completely random from the
view of the adversary A1. So, the received ciphertext CTω is
not compliant to the game (i.e. invalid ciphertext). Therefore,
the adversary A1 chooses ω′ randomly. Hence, the probability
of the adversary A1 for outputting ω′ = ω is 12 .
If Z = eˆ(g, g)abc, then adversary A1 receives a valid
ciphertext. The adversary A1 wins the CPA game with non-
negligible advantage  (according to Theorem 2). As such,
the probability of outputting ω′ = ω for the adversary A1 is
1
2 + , where probability  is for guessing that the received
ciphertext is valid and probability 12 is for guessing whether
the valid encrypted message C1 is related to K0 or K1.
Therefore, the overall advantage AdvIND−CPAA1 of the sim-
ulator B is 12 ( 12 + + 12 )− 12 = 2 .
2) Security against Chosen Keyword Attack: Chosen key-
word attack (CKA) security of the proposed scheme can be
defined by the following theorem and proof.
Theorem 3. If a PPT adversary A2 wins the CKA security
game defined in Section III-E2 with a non-negligible advan-
tage , then a PPT simulator B can be constructed to break
DBDH assumption with non-negligible advantage 2 .
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Proof. In this proof, we show that a simulator B can be
constructed to help an adversary A2 to gain advantage 2
against our proposed scheme.
The DBDH challenger C chooses random numbers
(a, b, c, z) ∈ Z∗q and flips a binary random coin l. It sets
Z = eˆ (g, g)
abc if l = 0 and Z = eˆ (g, g)z otherwise.
Afterwards, challenger C sends A = ga, B = gb, C = gc and
Z to the simulator B, and it asks the simulator B to output l.
Now simulator B acts as a challenger in the rest of the security
game.
In the following game simulator B interacts with the adver-
sary A2 as follows:
INIT Adversary A2 sends a challenged role set Γ∗ and two
identities (ID∗c , ID
∗
u) to the simulator B.
SETUP Simulator B chooses random numbers
{ζk, ϑk, %k}∀k∈Φ. It also chooses random numbers
{αrki }∀i∈Ψk,∀k∈Φ ∈ Z∗q . Simulator B computes
Y = eˆ (g, g)
ab
= eˆ (A,B) , {hk1 = gb·ζk = Bζk}∀k∈Φ. It also
computes PKrki = g
b
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j = B
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j for all
rki ∈ Ψk, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Moreover, simulator B computes
{
PKey
rkw
rki
=
∏
∀rkj ∈Rrk
i
\{rkw} αrkj
}
∀rkw∈Rrk
i
\{rki }

∀rki ∈Ψk
where 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
Moreover, simulator B chooses a random number sID∗u ∈
Z∗q and computes hid∗c = H1(ID
∗
c). It then computes
{Privkc, Pub1kc , Pub2kc , PubkIDu}∀k∈Φ, where
Privkc =H2
(
g
a·b·hid∗c
b·%k
)
= H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
Pub1kc =g
b·ϑk·Privkc = Bϑk·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
Pub2kc =g
b·%k·Privkc = B%k·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
PubkIDu =g
H2
g
a·b·sID∗u +b·%k
b·ζk

sID∗u = g
H2
A
sID∗u
ζk ·g
%k
ζk

sID∗u (29)
Simulator B sends the follow-
ing parameters to the adversary A2:〈
q,G1,GT , eˆ, H1, H2, Y, {hk1}∀k∈Φ, {{PKrki}∀rki ∈Ψk}∀k∈Φ,{{
PKey
rkw
rki
}
∀rkw∈Rrk
i
\{rki }
}
∀rki ∈Ψk,∀k∈Φ
, {Pub1kc , Pub2kc ,
PubkIDu}∀k∈Φ
〉
. Simulator B also sends private keys
{Privkc}∀k∈Φ and PrivIDu = sID∗u to the adversary A2.
PHASE 1 Adversary A2 sends a set of roles S∗ and a
keyword w to the simulator B for the trapdoor. Simulator
B chooses random numbers (v, ts) ∈ Z∗q . It computes
hw = H1(w). Simulator B computes the trapdoor Trap =
〈
tr1, tr2, tr3, tr4, {tr1rkx , tr
2
rkx
}∀rkx∈S∗
〉
, where
tr1 =
sID∗u + ts
H2
(
g
a·b·sID∗u +b·%k
b·ζk
) · v = [sID∗u + ts]v
H2
(
A
sID∗u
ζk · g
%k
ζk
)
tr2 =
(
g
a·b·sID∗u +b·%k
b·ζk
)v
= A
sID∗u ·v
ζk · g
%k·v
ζk
tr3 =g
v
sID∗u = g
v
sID∗u
tr4 =g
v (30)
For all rkx ∈ S∗,
tr1rkx =
g a·b·sID∗u +b·ϑkb∏∀rkj ∈Rrkx αrkj

v
hw
=A
sID∗u ·v
hw
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rkx
α
rk
j · g
ϑk·v
hw
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rkx
α
rk
j
tr2rkx =
(
g
a·b·sID∗u +b·ϑk
b·α
rkx
) v
hw
= A
sID∗u ·v
hw·αrkx · g
ϑk·v
hw·αrkx (31)
Finally, simulator B sends trapdoor Trap to the adversary
A2.
CHALLENGE When adversary A2 decides that PHASE 1 is
over, it submits two equal length keywords w0 and w1 to the
simulator B. Simulator B flips a random binary coin ω and
encrypts wω with the challenged role set Γ∗.
Simulator B first computes hwω = H1(wω). It then
chooses a random element K ∈ GT and five poly-
nomials q1(x), q2(x), q3(x), q4(x) and q5(x) of degree
2, |Γ∗Φ|, |Γ∗Φ|, |Γ∗| and |Γ∗| respectively as follows:
• q1(x): Simulator B implicitly sets q1(0) = c and
randomly chooses the rest of the points to define the
polynomial q1(x) completely. Note that q1(1) and q1(2)
implicitly represent di and dj of our original scheme
respectively.
• q2(x): Simulator B sets q2(0) = q1(1) and randomly
chooses the rest of the points to define q2(x) completely.
• q3(x): Simulator B sets q3(0) = q1(2) and randomly
chooses the rest of the points to defined q3(x) completely.
• q4(x): Simulator B sets q4(0) = q1(1) and randomly
chooses the rest of the points to define q4(x) completely.
• q5(x): Simulator B sets q5(0) = q1(2) and randomly
chooses the rest of the points to define q5(x) completely.
Now, simulator B computes a challenged ciphertext CTω =
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TABLE II: NOTATIONS
Notation Description
|Γ| Total number of roles associated with a ciphertext
|ΓΦ| Total number of SAs associated with Γ (i.e., ciphertext)
|SIDu | Total number of roles associated with a trapdoor
nc Total number of ciphertext associated with a revoked role
nu Total number users associated with a revoked role
ns Total number SA associated with a user
〈
C1, C2, C3, {C4k, C ′4k}∀k∈Γ∗Φ , {Crki , C ′rki }∀rki ∈Γ∗
〉
, where
C1 =K · Z
C2 =g
b·ζk·q1(2) = Bζk·q1(2)
C3 =g
b·%k·H2
(
g
a·b·hid∗c
b·%k
)
·q1(2) = B%k·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
·q1(2)
C4k =
{
gb·ϑk·H2
(
g
a·b·hid∗c
b·%k
)
·q2(i)
=Bϑk·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
·q2(i)
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ∗Φ|
C ′4k =
{
gb·ϑk·H2
(
g
a·b·hid∗c
b·%k
)
·q3(i)
=Bϑk·H2
(
A
hid∗c
%k
)
·q3(i)
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ∗Φ|
Crki =
{
g
hwω ·b·q4(i)
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j
=B
hwω ·q4(i)
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ∗|
C ′rki =
{
g
hwω ·b·q5(i)
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j
=B
hwω ·q5(i)
∏
∀rk
j
∈R
rk
i
α
rk
j
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γ∗| (32)
Similar with CPA proof VI-A1, the distribution of the
ciphertext CTω for Γ∗ is identical to the original scheme.
PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1
GUESS The adversary A2 guesses a bit ω′ and sends to the
simulator B. If ω′ = ω then the adversary A2 wins CPA game;
otherwise it fails. If ω′ = ω, simulator B answers “DBDH” in
the game (i.e. outputs l = 0); otherwise B answers “random”
(i.e. outputs l = 1).
If Z = eˆ(g, g)z; then C1 is completely random from the
view of the adversary A2. So, the received ciphertext CTω is
not compliant to the game (i.e. invalid ciphertext). Therefore,
the adversary A2 chooses ω′ randomly. Hence, the probability
of the adversary A2 for outputting ω′ = ω is 12 .
If Z = eˆ(g, g)abc, then adversary A2 receives a valid
ciphertext. The adversary A2 wins the CPA game with non-
negligible advantage  (according to the Theorem 3). As such,
the probability of outputting ω′ = ω for the adversary A2 is
1
2 + , where probability  is for guessing that the received
ciphertext is valid and probability 12 is for guessing whether
the valid encrypted message C1 is related to w0 or w1.
Therefore, the overall advantage AdvIND−CKAA2 of the
simulator B is 12 ( 12 + + 12 )− 12 = 2 .
Fig. 4: Computation Time of Data Encryption and Trapdoor
Generation Phases
Fig. 5: Computation Time of AUTHENTICATION and PAR-
TIALDEC Algorithms
B. Performance Analysis
This section evaluates functionality, computation, storage
and communication overhead of our proposed scheme. The
computational overhead is shown in terms of number of
pairing (Tp) and group exponentiation operations (ExpG1
and ExpGT ). We do not consider the other cryptographic
operations such as hash and group element multiplication
operations, as these operations take much less computation
time compared with the pairing and group exponentiation
operations (details can be seen in the Table VI). The storage
and communication overheads are shown in terms of group el-
ement size |Z∗q |, |G1| and |GT |. We use PBC library [34] which
runs over GMP library [35] for the implementation purpose.
Type A elliptic curve of 160-bit group order embedding degree
2 is used for the implementation. The chosen curve provides
an equivalent of 1024-bit discrete log security. The elementary
cryptographic operations that are performed by the owners and
users are implemented using a commodity laptop Computer
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TABLE III: Functionality Comparison
Authorized Keyword
Search Authentication Replay Attack
Conjunctive Keyword
Search Revocation Decryption Technique
[9] X 7 7 X X 7 ABE
[6] X 7 7 7 7 7 ABE
[25] X 7 7 X X X ABE
[26] X 7 7 7 7 7 ABE
Proposed scheme X X X X X X RBE
TABLE IV: Evaluation of the Computation Overhead
Operations Computation Complexity
Data Encryption (4 + |Γ|+ |ΓΦ|)ExpG1 + ExpGT
Trapdoor Generation (3 + 2|SIDu |)ExpG1
Data Search
Authentication (2 + |ΓΦ|)ExpG1 + 3Tp
KeySearch < (|Γ|+ 1)ExpG1 + (2 + |Γ|)Tp
PartialDec < (|Γ|+ |ΓΦ|)ExpG1 + (1 + |Γ|)Tp
Decryption ExpGT
Revocation < (1 + 2nc + 2nu)ExpG1
TABLE V: Evaluation of the Storage and Communication
Overhead
Items Overhead
Ciphertext (4 + 2|Γ|)|G1|+ |GT |
Secret key (1 + ns)|Z∗q |+ 2|SIDu ||G1|
Trapdoor |Z∗q |+ (3 + 2|Γ|)|G1|
TABLE VI: Computation Time (in Milliseconds) of Elemen-
tary Cryptographic Operations
Exponentiation Pairing Group multiplication HashG1 GT G1 GT
Commodity
Laptop 2.062 0.126 1.292 0.008 0.002 0.003
Workstation 1.153 0.091 0.645 0.005 0.001 0.002
Fig. 6: Computation Time of KEYSEARCH Algorithm for 1000
Ciphertexts
with Ubuntu 17.10 (64-bit) operating system and having
2.4GHz Core i3 processor with 4GB memory. The elementary
cryptographic operations that are performed by public cloud is
implemented using a workstation with Ubuntu 17.10 (64-bit)
operating system and having 3.5 GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E5-2637 v4 processor with 16 GB memory. Table VI shows
the time required to perform each cryptographic operations.
During the implementation, we consider that the number of
SAs associated with a RBAC access policy is equal to the
number of roles associated with a ciphertext, i.e., |Γφ| = |Γ|.
It is to be noted that all the implementation results are the
mean of 50 trials. The notations used in the rest of this paper
are shown in Table II.
Table III shows the functionality comparison of some no-
table ABE based keyword search schemes [6], [9], [25], [26]
with our proposed scheme. From the Table III, it can be
observed that all the ABE based schemes [6], [9], [25], [26]
including our proposed scheme provide authorized keyword
search functionality, as the owner can embed access policies
of his/her choice on the encrypted data itself. However, unlike
our proposed scheme, none of the schemes in [6], [9], [25],
[26] address the user authentication problem, which allows
the public cloud to authenticate the user before performing
computationally expensive keyword search operations. As
such, [6], [9], [25], [26] rely on some existing authentication
mechanisms. Also, unlike [6], [9], [25], [26], our proposed
scheme can prevent the replay attacks even if the trapdoors
are exposed to the adversaries. In [6], [9], [25], [26], if an
adversary gains access to a valid trapdoor, the adversary can
re-use the trapdoor using a fresh random number. Further, our
proposed scheme and [9], [25] support conjunctive keyword
search and user revocation, while [6], [26] do not support.
Moreover, our proposed scheme and [25] support both the
keyword search and decryption functionalities; while [6], [9],
[26] support only the keyword search functionality. Further-
more, [6], [9], [25], [26] are designed using ABE technique;
while our proposed scheme is designed using RBE technique,
which enables it to support the role hierarchy property. Thus, it
makes our proposed scheme more suitable for the real world
organizations/enterprises. Therefore, it can be observed that
our proposed scheme supports more functionalities compared
with the other notable works [6], [9], [25], [26].
Table IV shows the computation overhead of our proposed
scheme9. The computation cost is shown in asymptotic upper
bound in the worst cases. In Table IV, we consider the most
frequently operated phases, e.g., Data Encryption, Trapdoor
Generation, Data Search, Decryption, and Revocation.
a) Data Encryption: Owner encrypts the plaintext data
and the associated keywords in the Data Encryption phase,
which requires (4 + 2|Γ|) group exponentiation operations
on G1 and one exponentiation operation on GT . It can be
observed that the encryption cost mainly depends on the
number of roles associated with a ciphertext (i.e., associated
with the chosen RBAC access policy). This can also be seen
9We do not consider [6], [9], [25], [26] for further comparison, as they are
based on ABE; whereas our proposed scheme is based on RBE.
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from the Figure 4. It can be observed that approximately 31
milliseconds are required to generate a ciphertext associated
with 5 roles and 5 SAs. It is to be noted that, the encryption
operation is performed by the owner only once for a particular
data.
b) Trapdoor Generation: A user needs to perform (3 +
2|SIDu |) group exponentiation operations on G1 to compute a
trapdoor. It can be observed that the cost for the generation
of a trapdoor depends on the number of roles associated with
the user (i.e., associated with the trapdoor). Figure 4, shows
the experimental results of the Trapdoor Generation phase,
which demonstrates that our proposed scheme incurs less
computation overhead on the user side. It takes approximately
29 milliseconds to generate a trapdoor having 5 roles.
c) Data Search: In the Data Search phase, the public
cloud first authenticates the user which requires 2+|ΓΦ| group
exponentiation operations on G1 and three pairing operations.
It can be observed that the cost of the user authentication
operation (i.e., AUTHENTICATION algorithm) depends on the
number of SAs associated with the RBAC access policy
of a ciphertext. Figure 5 shows the computation time of
AUTHENTICATION algorithm with respect to the number of
SAs. It is to be noted that the AUTHENTICATION algorithm
is performed only once per user request. After successful
authentication of the user, the public cloud computes at most
|Γ| + 1 group exponentiation operations on G1, and 2 + |Γ|
pairing operations to complete the KEYSEARCH algorithm
for the keyword search. It can be observed that the cost of
the KEYSEARCH algorithm depends on the number of roles
associated with the ciphertext, which can also be seen from
the Figure 6. Finally, the public cloud computes at most
|Γ|+ |ΓΦ| group exponentiation operations and 1+ |Γ| pairing
operations to compute the PARTIALDEC algorithm. It can be
observed that the cost to perform the PARTIALDEC algorithm
depends on the number of roles and the number of SAs
associated with the RBAC access policy. The computation time
of PARTIALDEC algorithm is shown in the Figure 5. It is to be
noted that the PARTIALDEC algorithm is performed for each
ciphertext received from the KEYSEARCH algorithm.
d) Decryption: As most of the computationally expen-
sive cryptographic operations are outsourced to the public
cloud, a user requires only one group exponentiation operation
on GT to decrypt a ciphertext. It is to be noted that the time
required to perform one group exponentiation operation on GT
is 0.126 milliseconds in a commodity laptop Computer. Hence,
the decryption cost in our proposed scheme is considerably
less. Thus, our proposed scheme is also suitable for an
environment such as IoT, where the end-users have limited
computing resources.
e) Revocation: The complete user revocation operation
takes a minimal overhead in the system, as the SA can revoke
the user simply by revoking (or removing) his/her public key
(from the public bulletin board). On the other hand, the SA
requires at most 1+2nc+2nu group exponentiation operations
on G1 to revoke a role from a user. As the SA needs to
re-encrypt all the ciphertexts and update role-keys of all the
users related with the revoked roles, the cost of the role-level
revocation depends mainly on the number of ciphertext and
users associated with the revoked roles.
1) Storage and Communication Overhead Comparison:
Table V shows the storage and communication overhead of our
proposed scheme. For the evaluation purpose, the ciphertext
size, size of the secret keys possessed by a user, and the
trapdoor size are considered. From Table V, it can be observed
that the ciphertext size mainly depends on the number of roles
associated with the ciphertext. For each role rki , the owner
computes two ciphertext components Crki and C
′
rki
. Hence,
the ciphertext size linearly increases with the roles associated
with a ciphertext.
A user keeps a private key PrivkIDu for each organization,
and the user also keeps a common private key PrivIDu for
all the organizations. Moreover, the user keeps two role-keys
for each role he/she possessed. Thus, the size of the secret
key possessed by a user mainly depends on the number of
SAs (i.e., number of organizations) and the number of roles
associated with that user. Similarly, trapdoor size linearly
increases with the roles associated with the trapdoor. The user
computes two trapdoor components tr1rkx and tr
2
rkx
for each role
rkx associated with the trapdoor.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a novel authorized keyword search
mechanism with efficient decryption using the RBE technique
for a cloud environment, where multiple organizations can
outsource their sensitive data. The proposed scheme enables
the owners to define and enforce RBAC access policies on
the encrypted data, thereby avoiding reducing the dependency
on the service provider. It also enables the public cloud to
authenticate the users first before performing computationally
expensive search operations, which reduces overhead on the
system. In addition, the proposed scheme helps to prevent re-
play attacks. Conjunctive keyword search is supported without
introducing any significant overhead into the system. Further,
the complete and role-level user revocation mechanisms are
supported for revoking access privileges of the users in both
organization level and role level respectively. Moreover, an
outsourced decryption mechanism is introduced in the pro-
posed scheme to reduce decryption processing cost at the end-
user side, which makes it suitable for resource constrained
environment. Furthermore, we have formally proved that the
proposed scheme provides provable security against Chosen
Plaintext and Chosen Keyword Attacks. Our performance
analysis shows that the proposed scheme is suitable for real-
world applications in terms of computation, communication
and storage overhead.
This paper has introduced a new direction in designing a
searchable encryption mechanism using the RBE technique.
Further works include improving the efficiency of role-level
revocation of RBE based keyword search schemes as well as
for dynamic addition (removal) of roles into (from) a role
hierarchy.
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